Boeing 757-222 — registry & accident history
Compiled from FAA & NTSB records · as of Jul 24, 2026
There are 100 Boeing 757-222 airframes on record (built 1989–1999), 38 currently registered. 5 have one or more NTSB accident records (6 records total). Data as of Jul 24, 2026.
Recent Boeing 757-222 accidents
the first officer's failure to maintain the correct airspeed and pitch attitude during landing that resulted in a tailstrike.
The flight's encounter with known severe turbulence associated with mountain wave activity, which resulted in a flight attendant sustaining a broken ankle.
**This probable cause was modified on 4/5/2012. Please see the public docket for this accident to view the original probable cause.** The initial damage to the fan blades was caused by the ingestion of a Red-Tailed Hawk that caused one or more fan blades to fracture, striking the fan case and causing it to bulge. The initial fan blade fragment release impacted and damaged other passing fan blades generating various sized blades fragments. Some of these blade fragments were propelled forward of the fan case by passing fan blades and were reingested, creating a cascading effect of collateral impact damage to the other fan blades, the fan case, and the inlet cowl.
The ground crewmembers’ failure to follow proper procedures for removing a stuck or jammed tow bar, which resulted in a ground crew injury.
The ignition of the J5 power terminal located on the captain’s No. 1 windshield due to a loose electrical connection between the terminal connector lug and its respective terminal block. The loose connection resulted from a missing lock washer that allowed the resistance in the electrical path to increase sufficiently to generate high enough temperatures to ignite the terminal block. Contributing to the probable cause was the lack of instructions to ensure the lock washer was installed in the J5 power terminal block in the Boeing 757 aircraft maintenance manual (AMM). Additionally, contributing to the incident was the deferral of the related maintenance write-up before the incident, which resulted from information in the United Airlines AMM that stated, “When bus bar(s) show signs of blackening or burning, the condition is acceptable for continued service, although the window must be replaced within 50 flight-hours.
The company tug operator's failure to maintain clearance with another aircraft during the pushback process. Also causal was the ground controller's failure to alert the pilot of the other aircraft and tug operator of this airplane of the simultaneous pushback occurring from adjacent gates. Contributing to the accident was the company's pushback operation without the use of wing/tail walkers.