Sikorsky S-61N — registry & accident history
Compiled from FAA & NTSB records · as of Jul 29, 2026
There are 99 Sikorsky S-61N airframes on record (built 1960–1985), 45 currently registered. 7 have one or more NTSB accident records (7 records total, 3 with a fatal highest-injury classification). Data as of Jul 29, 2026.
Recent Sikorsky S-61N accidents
A total loss of engine power due to the failure of the No. 2 engine’s stage 1 turbine blades as a result of an unreported hot start two days earlier.
The improper installation of the fore/aft primary servo by maintenance personnel, which resulted in the attaching hardware backing out and which subsequently rendered the helicopter uncontrollable. Contributing to the accident was the company’s quality control personnel to identify the improper installation before certifying the helicopter for flight.
Fatigue cracking of the auxiliary servo cylinder’s pedal damper check valve housing and its bolts, which caused the sudden and uncommanded movement of the helicopter’s left pedal and a subsequent left yaw that continued until ground impact. Contributing to the accident were (1) the nonconforming edge of the pedal damper check valve housing during manufacture and (2) Sikorsky’s lack of a specific inspection for the pedal damper check valve housing.
A dual loss of engine power for undetermined reasons after the pilot's improper decision to attempt another maneuver after recovering from a perceived compressor stall, rather than returning to the airport.
The following actions by Carson Helicopters: 1) the intentional understatement of the helicopter's empty weight, 2) the alteration of the power available chart to exaggerate the helicopter's lift capability, and 3) the practice of using unapproved above-minimum specification torque in performance calculations that, collectively, resulted in the pilots relying on performance calculations that significantly overestimated the helicopter's load-carrying capacity and did not provide an adequate performance margin for a successful takeoff; and insufficient oversight by the U.S. Forest Service and the Federal Aviation Administration. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the flight crewmembers to address the fact that the helicopter had approached its maximum performance capability on their two prior departures from the accident site because they were accustomed to operating at the limit of the helicopter’s performance. Contributing to the fatalities were the immediate, intense fire that resulted from the spillage of fuel upon impact from the fuel tanks that were not crash resistant, the separation from the floor of the cabin seats that were not crash resistant, and the use of an inappropriate release mechanism on the cabin seat restraints.